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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TOM SNYDER, 
: REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
: Case No. 20010203-SC 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation and 
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney 
for Murray City Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
Plaintiff/Appellant Tom Snyder submits the following reply 
brief: 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Murray City and H. Craig Hall (hereinafter "Murray City" 
"The City") have not filed an appeal. The City's gratuitous 
recitation of its "issues presented for review" in Mr. Snyder's 
appeal is not helpful. The opening brief filed by appellant, Tom 
Snyder, sets forth the issues presented for review and now before 
this Court. No other issues are before the court in this matter. 
REPLY TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City asserts that Snyder is not entitled to revisit the 
factual background of this case and that Snyder is bound by the 
conclusions of the federal courts. Brief of Appellees, pp. 3-4. 
Murray City cites no authority its assertion. Snyder's current 
state claims are unique from those determined by the federal 
courts. Snyder's state claims differ from those determined by 
the federal courts. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 
1349, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1997). 
The City suggests that the Opening Ceremony is to "include 
an inspirational thought or message, which may include a prayer . 
. . ." Brief of Appellees, p. 5. However, the time was set 
aside primarily for opening prayer. Hall Letter, June 1, 1994 
(R. 128) (reverence period is referred to as "prayer" and 
distinguished specifically from "comments"). 
The City suggests that its policy has been "to expect and 
encourage those persons giving commencement thoughts or prayers 
to promote civility, lofty thoughts and attention to agenda 
items." Brief of Appellees, p. 5. There is no evidence that the 
City had any criteria concerning prayers before Snyder requested 
to give his prayer. Instead, rather than placing any limits or 
requirements or even making suggestions concerning the content of 
opening prayers, letters sent by the City to those interested in 
participating in the ceremonies spoke only of dates and times. 
Depo. of Hall at 12-13, 14-15 & 25 (R. 144, 145, 147). The City 
admits that none of the letters sent to interested participants 
contained any reference to standards or content requirements that 
would be applied to potential opening prayers. Id. The City 
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presents no evidence that any standards or content requirements 
were ever communicated verbally to those interested in presenting 
prayers during the Opening Ceremonies. Id. The City never 
communicated these exceptions to any participants in the Opening 
Ceremonies; these expectations were secret, unilateral and 
meaningless. Id. 
Only after the City knew the contents of Snyder's proposed 
Opening Prayer, (Depo. of Hall at 18-20 (R. 146)), did the City 
reveal its supposed criteria for opening prayers. Hall Letter, 
June 1, 1994 (R. 128). The criteria recited in that letter was 
tailor-made for Snyder. This criteria had never been applied to 
anyone else. Depo. of Hall at 12-13 (R. 144). Thus, the City 
did not have a policy concerning opening prayers other than its 
ad hoc policy specifically created to exclude Snyder. 
The City reiterates that it attempted to insure a diversity 
of religious views and other opinions were expressed during its 
Opening Ceremonies. Brief of Appellees, p. 5. Allowing Snyder 
to present his prayer during the Opening Ceremonies would further 
the City's goal of diversity. Snyder's prayer presents non-
mainstream opinions and religious views. 
The City attempts to distinguish between public expenditures 
for religious expression and public expenditures Mfor the meeting 
and that portion of the agenda that consists of . . . prayers.'' 
Brief of Appellees, p. 6. The City's hair splitting should be 
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dismissed outright. The public expenditures are clearly for 
religious expression. Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 
870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
The City claims that no one has given a prayer or invocation 
during the Opening Ceremonies that attacked City policies or 
expressed political views. Brief of Appellees, p. 9. However, 
political views have been presented as part of the Opening 
Ceremonies. The City allows political views to be proclaimed 
during the Opening Ceremonies as long as Mr. Hall agrees with the 
political views expressed or finds them otherwise appropriate. 
Depo. of Hall at 25-26 (R. 147-148). 
Hall testified that the opening prayers given "during the 
past 10, 12 years" have been "positive, upbeat, exhorting the 
City Council to do what they [sic] ought to do under their 
statutory responsibilities." Depo. of Hall at 25 (R. 147). When 
asked "[s]o it's not all political views then that are banned," 
Hall replied that "I don't know that until I see what political 
views are proposed. I would have to make a decision at that 
point." Depo. of Hall at 26 (R. 148). Thus, the City allows 
upbeat political statements concerning the City's lawmaking 
purposes, other political issues are left to Hall's sole 
discretion. Id. 
Snyder's sincerity (or lack of sincerity) did not factor 
into the City's June 30, 1994 decision to refuse to allow him to 
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offer his Opening Prayer during the Opening Ceremonies. Depo. of 
Hall at 54-55 (R. 154). The City rejected the Opening Prayer 
because of its specific content and not because the City thought 
that the prayer and/or Snyder were insincere. Id. To propose 
insincerity now, to justify the City's misconduct, is spurious. 
Brief of Appellees, pp. 12-14. Rather, at issue is the 
unconstitutional reasons that the City actually used to reject 
Snyder's prayer. 
The City suggests again that it had a policy, albeit 
unannounced and never communicated, to expect and encourage the 
opening prayers or thoughts to promote civility, lofty ideas and 
attention to the agenda. Brief of Appellees, p. 9. In reality, 
the City had no policy regarding the opening prayers until it 
created a policy with which it could reject Snyder's prayer. 
In reply to Snyder's request to give a prayer, the City did 
not mention civility, loftiness or attention to the agenda. Hall 
Letters, June 1 and 30, 1994, (R. 128, 134). Thus, until this 
suit was filed and until Mr. Hall's deposition was taken, Snyder 
was not informed of any City policy other than: 
. . . the Council has established the policy that 
all council meetings will start with prayer. 
The purpose of the "prayer" is to allow 
individuals that opportunity to express thoughts, leave 
blessing, etc. It is not a time to express political 
views, attack city policies or practices or mock city 
practices or policies. 
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Hall Letter, June 1, 1994 (R. 128). If Mr. Hall at some time 
determined that the Opening Prayer "did not encourage people to 
have lofty thoughts, did not encourage people to be civil," etc., 
he did not inform Snyder that this was the basis of his 
rejection. This City "policy" was kept secret even from Snyder; 
the City's statements concerning this policy are suspect. 
The City seems suggests that because it offered Snyder the 
opportunity during another part of its meetings to express his 
view, it did not violate Snyder's constitutional rights when it 
barred his prayer from the Opening Ceremonies. Brief of 
Appellees, pp. 7 & 10. The public comment period is not set 
aside for prayer and does not have the prestige or influence 
enjoyed by the Opening Ceremonies. The City cannot justify its 
discrimination against Snyder's religious message by suggesting 
that he could have spoken at another time. 
The City's references to Snyder's religious beliefs are 
inappropriate and irrelevant. Brief of Appellees, pp. 10-11. 
While the City may not understand or appreciate Snyder's 
religious beliefs, the Utah Constitution protects all religious 
exercise equally, regardless of content or message. Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 936 (Utah 1993); United States v. 
Ward, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1992); Welsh v. United States, 398 
U.S. 333 (1970). The City may not judge the credibility of Mr. 
Snyder's religious beliefs. United States v. Seeqer, 380 U.S. 
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163, 184 (1964) ("The validity of what [an individual] believes 
cannot be questioned." "[TJhese inquires are foreclosed to 
Government.") "[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, 
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to 
merit First Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Board, 
Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1980). 
The City must also accept Mr. Snyder's personal estimation of his 
religious beliefs: "In such an intensely personal area, of 
course, the claim of the [individual] that his belief is an 
essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight." 
United States v. Seeqer, 380 U.S. at 184. 
The City's reference to the specifics of Snyder's religious 
view, its reference to the origin of Snyder's Opening Prayer and 
his motivation for giving the prayer are irrelevant to the 
present inquiry. Brief of Appellees, pp. 10-14. The City 
affirms that the sincerity of Snyder did not factor into its 
decision to refuse him the opportunity to offer his Opening 
Prayer during the Opening Ceremonies. Brief of Appellees, p. 9. 
The City rejected the Opening Prayer because of its specific 
content and not because the City thought that the prayer and/or 
Snyder were insincere. Brief of Appellees, pp. 10-14. 
Snyder's motivation for giving his Opening Prayer is not 
indicative of whether his beliefs are sincere. Mixed motivations 
(political, philosophical, and/or religious) should not cast 
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doubt on Snyder's sincerity. The most sincere religious devotees 
may have mixed motives for a decision to give a prayer before the 
City Council. The City's repeated references to the origin of 
the Opening Prayer and Snyder's motivations for giving it are 
immaterial and irrelevant. 
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
Res Judicata is inapplicable to Snyder's state law claims. 
Based upon the unique issues raised under Utah Constitutional 
Law, Mr. Snyder's state-law claims were dismissed without 
prejudice. Given the unique protection afforded religious 
freedoms in Utah, this Court is entitled to make its own factual 
determinations, and is entitled to review Snyder's remaining 
state-law claims. 
The City's refusal to permit Snyder to give his prayer 
before the Murray City Council violates Snyder's right to free 
exercise of religion under Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. Utah law is designed to protect religious exercise 
and freedom of conscience and prevent limitations based on 
religious beliefs. Under Society of Separationists, Murray City 
violated Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right to perfect religious 
toleration. The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's 
religious exercise and violated his right to free exercise. 
Snyder's Free Speech Claim is timely and was properly before 
the court below. This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
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recognized a "continuing wrong" theory when applying a statute of 
limitations. The City takes the position today that Utah law 
does not afford Snyder access to the prayer portion of the City 
Council meetings. Snyder's Free Speech claim is a facial 
challenge to the current unwritten policies and practices of the 
City. 
By refusing to allow Snyder to pray before the Murray City 
Council, the City violated Article I, § 15 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Opening Ceremony is a limited (or designated) 
public forum. As a result, any regulation must serve a 
compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. The City has not done so. The interests asserted by 
the City are not compelling to justify the restriction of free 
speech under the Utah Constitution. 
Murray City's practice of prayers before City Council 
meetings is not applied in a neutral matter and violates Article 
I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Constitution does not 
permit public expenditures and the use of public property to 
"directly" benefit religious exercise. The City may encourage 
public prayer at its Council meetings only when "the state is 
neutral" and thereby "indirectly" benefitting religious exercise. 
The City's bias against Snyder's religious message violates 
the "neutrality principal." Those, like Snyder, who express non-
traditional or unorthodox religious viewpoints, are prohibited 
9 
from participating in religious offerings before the City 
Council. 
The City provided Snyder with no due process in his request 
to present his prayer. The essential requirements of due process 
are notice and an opportunity to respond. The City failed to 
supply Snyder with even basic protection. Simple due process 
protections—written criteria, notice, an opportunity to respond, 
an impartial arbiter, findings, notice of the right to appeal, an 
appellate review—may have prevented the harm to Snyder. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. RES JUDICATA IS INAPPLICABLE TO SNYDER'S STATE LAW CLAIMS. 
Murray City is correct in that Snyder is prohibited from 
again raising his federal claims. Those legal issues have been 
adjudicated. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized the unique issues raised under Utah Constitutional 
Law, and dismissed without prejudice Mr. Snyder's state-law 
claims as follows: 
The Supreme Court of Utah recently rejected a 
challenge to Salt Lake City's practice of opening its 
city council meetings with a prayer. Society of 
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
While that challenge was brought under the provision of 
Utah's Constitution which prohibited the expenditure of 
public monies for religious purposes and not under its 
Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses, the Supreme Court 
of Utah stated in Society of Separationists that it would 
not follow federal constitutional models in interpreting 
the Religion Clauses of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 
930, 931 n.36. Given that the interpretation of those 
Clauses appears to be undergoing an evolution, and given 
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the complex issues of state law presented, we decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Snyder's 
state-law claims. 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 
1997) . 
While the Court of Appeals highlighted Snyder's rights 
regarding the religion clauses of the Utah Constitution, the 
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over any of his state-law 
claims so that he could pursue them in the appropriate court. 
The City argues that this Court should accept as absolute 
the factual findings made by the United States District Court. 
Brief of Appellees, p. 4. There has never been a trial regarding 
the factual underpinnings in this case. These "facts" were 
decided on Summary Judgment motions. A court does not make 
factual findings in determining a summary judgment. There has 
been no full and fair litigation of any of the issues the City 
desires this Court to now adopt. 
Candidly, the City admits that it "has been unable to find a 
Utah case expressly addressing the question whether claim or 
issue preclusion serves to prevent relitigation in Utah state 
courts of civil claims or issues in federal courts . . . ." 
Brief of Appellees, p. 20. Res Judicata is inapplicable. Given 
the unique protection afforded religious freedoms in Utah, this 
Court is entitled to make its own factual determinations, and is 
entitled to review Snyder's remaining state-law claims. 
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II. FREE EXERCISE CLAIM: 
A. THE CITY'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT SNYDER TO GIVE HIS PRAYER 
BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY COUNCIL VIOLATES SNYDER'S RIGHT TO 
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION UNDER ARTICLE I, § 4 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The City argues that it had no affirmative duty to provide 
Snyder a forum to exercise his religion. Brief of Appellees, p. 
25. The City refers to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in response to Snyder's Free Exercise Claim. Id. While 
the City's position may be accurate under federal constitutional 
law, the Utah Constitution provides Snyder more protection. 
Article III of the Utah Constitution states that " [p]erfect 
toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed." Based on this 
strong language, Art. I, § 4, the legislative and general history 
of Utah, this Court determined that Utah law "is designed to 
protect religious exercise and freedom of conscience in general . 
. . and to prevent the imposition of civil limitations based on 
one's religious beliefs or lack thereof." Society of Separa-
tionists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 935 (Utah 1993). This Court 
concluded that the Utah Constitution mandated government 
neutrality toward religious practices. Id. at 936. 
This Court defined a prayer as "an address of entreaty, 
supplication, praise or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or 
divine spirit, being or object." Society of Separationists, 870 
P.2d at 931-32 (quoting Karen B. v. Trenn, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th 
Cir. 1981), aff'd mem. 455 U.S. 913 (1982)). In Utah, an address 
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which calls upon a celestial or supreme entity is prayer and is 
religious exercise even though it may appear to be non-religious 
or have a secular purpose: "That [a prayer] may contemplate some 
wholly secular objective cannot alter the inherently religious 
character of the exercise." Id. 
Therefore, under Society of Separationists, Murray City 
violated Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right to perfect religious 
toleration. Snyder's supplication is a prayer and a religious 
exercise. The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's 
religious exercise and violated his right to free exercise. 
The City argues that its suppression of Snyder religious 
views was justified because his prayer was political or philo-
sophical in nature. Brief of Appellees, p. 27, 381, & 39. 
Nevertheless, under Society of Separationists, the City cannot 
discriminate against Snyder's prayer based on the City's mis-
perception that the prayer was not religious. 
The City suggests that because it offered Snyder the 
opportunity during another part of its meetings to express his 
view, it did not violate Snyder's constitutional rights. What 
the City offered to Snyder is the part of its meeting open to 
general public comment. Brief of Appellees, pp. 25, 27, & 46. 
1
 Of note, the City's true position is they can discern the 
nature of an offering. The City asserts, "What Appellant 
proposed to say in the Opening Ceremony is not a legislative 
prayer at all, but a piece of partisan political rhetoric." 
Brief of Appellees, p. 38. 
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The public comment period is not set aside for prayer and does 
not have the prestige or influence enjoyed by the Opening 
Ceremonies. The City cannot justify its discrimination against 
Snyder' s religious message by suggesting that he could have 
spoken at another time. Relegating Snyder to the public comment 
period of the meeting ("to the back of the bus") because the City 
finds Snyder's religious message offensive is as repugnant and 
unconstitutional as entirely banning his prayer from the meeting. 
B. THE CITY'S CONTINUED RELIANCE ON SUGGESTIONS REGARDING 
SNYDER'S SINCERITY IS ILL FOUNDED. 
The City continues to suggest that its assessment of 
Snyder's religious beliefs is pertinent to this inquiry. Brief 
of Appellees, p. 27. Snyder has sworn under oath that his 
religious belief's are sincere and deeply held. His affirmations 
must be accepted as true. They are uncontroverted. 
The best and only reliable indications of Snyder's 
earnestness are his own sworn statements that his beliefs are 
sincere. Under oath, Snyder has stated 
[My] personal and strongly held religious belief is that 
prayers are a private matter between an individual and 
his or her God. [My] religious upbringing and beliefs 
lead [me] to believe that Jesus Christ specifically spoke 
out against public prayers, including prayers before 
government meetings. 
Affidavit of Snyder, 1 26 (R. 58). In making this assertion, 
Snyder relies on Matthew 6:5-6 from the New Testament and 3 Nephi 
13:5-6 from the Book of Mormon. Snyder believes that 
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[u]sing God's name or the name of Christ in a public 
prayer (directly contrary to God's clear teaching) is 
blasphemous, irreverent, and impious misuse of those 
names. 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, 1 33 (R. 88). 
Snyder's sincerity and the religious nature of Snyder's 
beliefs are evident. He cites the religious basis for his 
opposition to public prayer. Snyder's belief is not unique. He 
strongly believes it not merely unwise or politically 
manipulative to open public meetings with prayer, but that it is 
blasphemy. His belief is based on his religious upbringing and 
his understanding of portions of the Bible and the Book of Mormon 
and the commandments of Jesus Christ. His convictions are 
sincerely-held religious beliefs, guaranteed protection under the 
Utah Constitution. 
The City suggests that Snyder's motivation for giving his 
Opening Prayer is also relevant to determining if Snyder's prayer 
is religious exercise. Brief of Appellees, pp. 27-28. However, 
Snyder's motivation for giving his Opening Prayer—to share with 
the City Council his aversion to public prayer as dictated by his 
religious views—is not any more indicative of the sincerity of 
his beliefs than the City's attempted assessment of Snyder's 
state of mind. An individual's motivations are not indicative of 
sincerity. Snyder can most certainly and most consistently hold 
his beliefs—for example that God might be female, that public 
prayer is hypocritical and that a wall should be erected between 
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church and state—and simultaneously wish to present these 
beliefs at the Opening Ceremonies. Indeed, the strength and 
sincerity of Snyder's beliefs prompted his desire to share these 
beliefs for the reasons the City finds so disturbing. Snyder 
wanted to reveal and explain the impropriety of the City's public 
prayer policy to the City's government. There is no better forum 
to suggest the religiously based impropriety of government 
sponsored public prayer than during an opening ceremony and 
prayer designed for that purpose. 
The City must accept as true the sincerity of Snyder's 
beliefs. Snyder's Opening Prayer is a prayer and a religious 
exercise. The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's 
religious exercise. This Court should find that under Society of 
Separationists, Murray City violated Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right 
to perfect religious toleration and free exercise. 
III. FREE SPEECH 
A. SNYDER'S FREE SPEECH CLAIM IS TIMELY AND WAS PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT BELOW. 
The City asserts that Snyder's Free Speech 1) was properly 
dismissed by the court below as time-barred, and 2) that Snyder 
did not preserve his claim in this matter therein. Brief of 
Appellees, p. 28-30. Statute of limitations was raised by the 
City for the first time at oral arguments. Snyder was given no 
time to prepare to defend the City's motion. The City, 
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ironically, now asserts that Snyder did not preserve his right to 
present legal grounds or theories for the City's oral motion. 
The City asserts that "until Mr. Snyder filed his opening brief, 
the City did not know, and did not have reason to know, that Mr. 
Snyder intended to rely upon this argument. . ."in relation to 
the statute of limitations.2 Brief of Appellees, p. 29. 
Similarly, Snyder did not know that the City would raise this 
issue at oral arguments, nor did he have reason to know that the 
trial court would grant such motion. As a result of the City's 
actions, Snyder's first opportunity to brief this issue is now 
before this Court. 
This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have recognized a 
"continuing wrong" theory when applying a statute of limitations. 
See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995) 
(in action for nuisance or trespass, statute of limitations 
depends on whether a nuisance or trespass is permanent or 
continuing); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (Orme, J., concurring) ("Courts have applied the 
"continuing wrong" theory in a variety of contexts, particularly 
where civil rights are at stake."). 
2
 The City is less than sincere in its assertion that it 
does not know the grounds and basis of Snyder's claims herein. 
As noted by the City (repeatedly), this matter has been ongoing 
for nearly seven (7) years. 
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The City lacks guidelines and criteria as to who can speak 
during the prayer portions of the Opening Ceremonies of the City 
Council meetings. In 1994, in 1999 (when this action was filed) 
and even today, the City claims the right to reject a prayer 
based upon a subjective unwritten criteria. The City takes the 
position today as in 1999 that Utah law does not afford Snyder 
access to the prayer portion of the City Council meetings. 
Snyder's Free Speech claim is a facial challenge to the current 
unwritten policies and practices of the City. 
Snyder's Complaint asks for prospective injunctive relief. 
Complaint, II 1, 4 & 54 (R. 2, 3, 15), & % 4 (relief) (R. 16). 
That equitable relief is based upon continuing misconduct of the 
City. The factual allegations of the Complaint recite the status 
of the City' s prayer policy as of the date of the Complaint 
(August 1999), as well as prior problems occurring in 1994. 
As a result, the court below erred in holding that Snyder's 
free speech claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
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B. BY REFUSING TO ALLOW SNYDER TO PRAY BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY 
COUNCIL, THE CITY VIOLATED ARTICLE I, § 15 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Murray City has created a designated public forum.3 The 
City argues that the Opening Ceremony is a nonpublic forum and as 
such, they were justified in limiting the speech therein. The 
City is in error. The City has created a designated public 
forum; this Court need merely examine "the policy and practice of 
the government," as well as "the nature of the property and its 
compatibility with expressive activity." Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
In the case at bar, the City sought 
to assure a broad cross-section of the community was 
represented. It made a list of diverse congregations, 
groups and associations within the community and invited 
people from such groups to give a thought, expression or 
prayer at the commencement of Council Meetings. 
Participants have included Native Americans and 
representatives from Zen Buddhists, a cross section of 
Judeo-Christian congregations, Quakers and others. 
Brief of Appellees, p. 6. The City has not developed any written 
guidelines as to offering of prayers.4 Hall Depo., 25:1-13, 
3
 The City attempts to distinguish between a limited public 
forum and a designated public forum. Brief of Appellees, p. 31 
n.15. There is little distinction between the two categories. 
Of importance herein, the City created a limited or a designated 
public forum wherein certain speech is allowed. Having so done, 
the City cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination in prohibiting 
access to the forum. 
4
 The City refers to "the genre of legislative prayer." 
See e.g. Brief of Appellees, 33, 35, 41-44. The Utah genre of 
legislative prayer is defined in Society of Separationists and 
not by Murray City. The City may desire only, generic, uplifting 
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119:9-15, 151:23 to 152:11 (R. 147, 168, 175). These facts 
indicate and demonstrate "on the part of the City [intent] to 
designate the reverence period as a public forum open to members 
of the community for the purpose of conveying religious and/or 
inspirational messages." Snyder v. Murray City, Corp., 159 F.3d 
1227, 1245 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). 
The Opening Ceremony is a limited (or designated) public 
forum. As a result, the City must prove that any "regulation is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry, Education Assn. v. 
Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
The City has not done so. The sole interest that the City has 
asserted is its right to promote "high mindedness", "order" and 
"civility." These are simply not compelling interests to justify 
the restriction of free speech under the Utah Constitution. 
As a result, this Court should reverse the dismissal of 
Snyder's free speech claims. 
V. MURRAY CITY'S PRACTICE OF PRAYERS BEFORE CITY COUNCIL 
MEETINGS IS NOT APPLIED IN A NEUTRAL MATTER AND VIOLATES ARTICLE 
I, § 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The City addresses the application of Society of 
Separationists as virtually a side-note. Brief of Appellees, p. 
or self aggrandizing prayers, but in Utah the legislative prayer 
session must welcome all comers and thoughts, even those that 
grate and challenge norms. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d 
at 938. 
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41. The City boldly asserts that its policy is applied " 'without 
regard to the belief system' of the participant." Brief of 
Appellees, p. 42 (quoting Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 
938). That is false.5 The facts at bar clearly controvert the 
City's assertion. The City admits to have examined Snyder's 
beliefs, and determined them not to be sincere. Nevertheless, 
the City now claims that it does not examine the belief system of 
the participant. The City is not being forthright. 
Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution does not permit public 
expenditures and the use of public property to "directly" benefit 
religious exercise. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 936-
37. Thus, the City may encourage public prayer at its City 
Council meetings only when "the state is neutral" and thereby 
"indirectly" benefitting religious exercise. 
To be neutral, government benefits "must be provided on a 
nondiscriminatory basis" and "must be equally accessible to all." 
Id. at 938. Thus, "if a city permits groups to use city-owned 
facilities, that use must be permitted without regard to the 
5
 The City also asserts, incorrectly, that "Appellant was 
not excluded because Mr. Hall or the City disagreed with 
Appellant's religious beliefs, as he maintains . . . ." Brief of 
Appellees, p. 44. In his speech claim, Snyder does not contend 
that is was direct "disagreement" with his ideas that caused the 
rejection. Rather, the constitutional violation occurred when 
the City rejected his prayer based upon a detailed review of the 
content and viewpoint of Snyder's expression. That Hall and the 
City disagreed with Snyder is not as damning as the content and 
viewpoint based rejection. 
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belief system of the user," Id. (emphasis added). In addition, 
"the government must implement a system that awards the benefit 
so that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically 
equal opportunity for the use of the public resource." Id.6 
The City's bias against Snyder's religious message violates 
the "neutrality principal" the this Court found in Art. I, § 4. 
Id. at 937-938. The City has provided a state benefit—the 
opportunity to pray during its Opening Ceremonies—to only some 
religious practitioners. Those, like Snyder, who express non-
traditional or unorthodox religious viewpoints, are prohibited 
from participating in religious offerings before the City 
Council. Indeed, the Utah Constitution requires government 
neutrality between religion and non-religion. Thus, the City's 
argument that it could refuse to allow Snyder to participate in 
the Opening Ceremonies because Snyder's message was political 
also fails. Under Art. I, § 4, the City cannot discriminate 
against Mr. Snyder because it finds his religious message is 
secular. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938. 
The City violates the establishment clause by favoring 
certain religious views over others; by creating a religious 
forum, inviting members from a variety of religious groups to 
pray in that forum while denying Snyder equal opportunity to 
6
 This holding prohibits the City's rejection of Snyder's 
prayer because it was secular, i.e., political or philosophical. 
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express his religious views there, the City has violated the 
neutrality requirement of the establishment clause. 
Murray City's banning of Snyder's prayer impermissibly 
establishes religion in violation of Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. The City determines which religious beliefs are 
appropriate for expression. The City's actions violate the clear 
neutrality mandate of this Court in Society of Separationists. 
IV. DUE PROCESS: THE CITY PROVIDED SNYDER WITH NO DUE PROCESS 
IN HIS REQUEST TO PRESENT HIS PRAYER. 
The City asserts that "the concept of due process is that 
some procedure minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions."' Brief 
of Appellees, p. 45. The City offers no discussion as to the due 
process that Snyder was afforded, because indeed the City 
afforded Snyder absolutely none. Completely depriving Snyder of 
any due process, the City gave him no hearing whatsoever. 
The essential requirements of due process are notice and an 
opportunity to respond. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 543, 546 (1985). "The opportunity to present reasons, 
either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be 
taken is a fundamental due process requirement." Id. The City 
failed to supply Snyder with even basic protection. 
The City suggests that Snyder had no interest at stake. 
Brief of Appellees, p. 46. The private interest at stake is 
Snyder's right to free expression and exercise of his religious 
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beliefs, a fundamental guarantee under the Utah Constitution. 
The risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used is 
great and apparent. Simple due process protections—written 
criteria, notice, an opportunity to respond, an impartial 
arbiter, findings, notice of the right to appeal, an appellate 
review—may have prevented the harm to Snyder. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The decision of the court below is in error and should be 
reversed. The conduct of Murray City and City Attorney Hall 
violated the free speech, free exercise, establishment and due 
process provisions of the Utah Constitution. Having created and 
opened a forum for expression, the City and Hall can not censor 
ideas based upon viewpoint or content. Snyder must be allowed to 
present his prayer at the important and reverent time set aside 
by the City for prayers before its council meetings. Snyder must 
be treated fairly and equitably in the same manner as all others 
offering prayers. 
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